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Abstract This policy paper deals with the main strategic issues for monetary policy in new EU
member states before their euro adoption. These are typically rooted in the challenge of ful-
ﬁlling concurrently of the Maastricht inﬂation and exchange rate criteria. In this paper we ﬁrst
put forward that these criteria are vaguely deﬁned and distinguish between the wording, written
interpretation and ’revealed’ interpretation (by the European authorities) of these criteria. Next,
the paper contain the comprehensive discussion of the strategic options for monetary policy in
the period of fulﬁlment of these criteria in terms of (i) its transparency, (ii) its continuity with
the previous monetary policy regime, (iii) the choice of central parity for the ERM II, (iv) the
setting of the ﬂuctuation bandwidth, (v) the probability of fulﬁlment of both criteria and (vi) the
impact on the autonomy of monetary policy.
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1. Introduction
Several European countries currently face, or will face in the near future, the question
of whether and in what time horizon their economies will be capable of fulﬁlling the
conditions for entering the euro area. In general, those conditions can be understood as
attaining such parameters in various ﬁelds of economic life that will ensure successful
operation of the economy in the environment of the single monetary policy of the Euro-
pean Central Bank (hereinafter the “ECB”). An important aspect of the conditions for
the entry into the euro area is the obligation to fulﬁl the convergence criteria ofﬁcially
incorporated into the EU Treaty (hereinafter the “Treaty”) at the Maastricht summit in
1992.
The requirement to fulﬁll these “Maastricht criteria” before entering the euro area
implies a number of challenges for domestic policy-makers in relation to the state of
the economy (see Angeloni et al. 2005; Buiter and Grafe 2002; Coricelli 2002; de
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Grauwe and Schnabl 2005; Hochreiter and Tavlas 2004; Dabrowski and Rostowski
2006; Kom´ arek et al. 2003; or Schadler 2005).
Our article deals with the challenges ensuing from the Maastricht criteria for the
monetary policies of the relevant countries’ national central banks. The inﬂation cri-
terion, the exchange rate criterion and the long-term nominal interest rate criterion
are of primary concern to the central banks. Fulﬁllment of the criterion for long-term
nominal interest rates is, in particular, closely linked with the fulﬁllment of the inﬂa-
tion criterion and with market conﬁdence in the country’s entry into the euro area.1
Consequently, we will concentrate on the inﬂation and exchange rate criteria.
Why is parallel fulﬁllment of inﬂation and exchange rate criteria a challenge for
the policy maker? Obviously, in a case of trend-less real exchange rate, the Maastricht
criteria may provide a reasonable test for a country aiming to adopt euro. On the other
hand, many countries in Central and Eastern Europe that are currently considering join-
ing the monetary union exhibit trend real exchange rate appreciation due to their con-
vergence process (´ Egert et al. 2006). In consequence, this makes fulﬁlling the inﬂation
and exchange rate criteria cumbersome, as greater chances of fulﬁlling one criterion
implies greater risk of failure in the other criterion. Clearly, this all depends on how
strong the trend real exchange rate appreciation is. The recent experience of this set of
countries suggests that the ability to fulﬁll these two criteria varies. While Lithuania
did not fulﬁll the inﬂation criterion in 2006, Slovakia managed to go through the ful-
ﬁllment of Maastricht criteria successfully and adopted euro in 2009 (see Horv´ ath and
Rusn´ ak 2009, for analysis of Slovak macroeconomy and the issues dealing with euro
adoption in Slovakia).
The majority of papers dealing with the potential conﬂict between the inﬂation and
the exchange rate convergence criteria focus on trend real exchange rate appreciation
and the Balassa-Samuelson (BSE) effect in particular. While earlier analyses estimated
the BSE to be relatively large, the estimates of more recent studies reveal a smaller ef-
fect. As Mihaljek (2002) points out, earlier studies often neglected productivity growth
in the non-tradable sector. Moreover, positive productivity growth in the tradable sec-
tor has also been estimated in the euro area, lessening the real appreciation tendency.
´ Egert et al. (2006) also do not ﬁnd BSE effect to be the main driving force behind
the trend appreciation. Different factors have rather been put forward instead. First, a
trend of a diminishing risk premium in the real version of the uncovered interest parity
relation may translate into trend appreciation. Second, other effects such as improve-
ments with regard to the terms of trade, price deregulation and initial undervaluation
of transition country currencies also tend to generate trend real appreciation.
However, thereisadditional, oftenneglected, aspectthatmakeseuroadoptioncum-
bersome, which is the degree of ambiguity existing in the formulations of the inﬂation
and exchange rate criteria in the Treaty. Therefore, the manner in which the individual
Maastricht criteria are interpreted by the ECB and the European Commission (here-
inafter the “EC”) in their Convergence Reports is gaining in importance. At the level
1 Besides the three criteria mentioned, the Treaty formulates another two criteria in the ﬁscal policy area.
These criteria within the euro adoption processes in the new EU member states are discussed, for example,
by Coricelli (2004).
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of the practical implementation of monetary policy, the question, then, is how to deal
with the ambiguity or more speciﬁcally, how to set the central bank euro adoption
strategies accordingly.2
The added value of this paper compared to other studies discussing the prepara-
tions for euro area entry is also in its comprehensive approach, encompassing all the
main issues relevant to the national central bank, including, for example, transparency
and credibility of monetary policy strategies or the asymmetry in the exchange rate
criterion. What we also consider to be a step in the right direction and also new in the
literature is our pragmatic focus on the interpretation of the criteria, and, conversely,
the fact that we refrain from analysing the economic meaningfulness of their wording
in the Treaty.3 Pushing through changes in the wording of the Treaty itself (and its
Protocols) we ﬁnd politically very difﬁcult and unlikely. Indeed, the EU summit which
took place in Brussels in June 2007 and whose primary purpose was to formulate a
“reform treaty” for the EU, did not open these issues at all. As a result, we do not
regard any analysis of potential change of the wording of the Treaty as very useful.
Kom´ arek et al. (2003) investigate the issue of management of the candidate coun-
tries’ exchange rates under the existing institutional and legislative framework of the
EU. They also discuss the “economic” factors inﬂuencing exchange rate strategies
on the path towards euro-area accession and brieﬂy review the present exchange rate
strategies of the EU candidate countries. We also contribute to the literature by in-
vestigating alternative scenarios for ERM II participation depending on the features
of chosen exchange rate regime and central parity setting with respect to market ex-
change rate. We focus on the factors behind the potential conﬂict between conducting
autonomous monetary policy and meeting the convergence criteria.
The questions to which this paper seeks answers, are, or will be, relevant to the
EU member states with a derogation from adopting the euro that have not yet entered
ERM II mechanism (currently Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and
Romania), and also to those countries which will stand at the gates of the euro area
in the future after joining the European Union (e.g. Croatia, Montenegro and possibly
Turkey). All these countries will for simplicity be termed euro-candidates (even if
some of them are not the EU members yet and thus their prospects of euro adoption are
still quite distant). Notwithstanding all the evident differences between these countries,
there are some prevailing tendencies in their current monetary policy strategies which
should be borne in mind, such as their preference for inﬂation targeting (this applies
to most euro-candidates mentioned above). We can also see, at least in the countries
where the question of ERM II entry is already relevant (the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland), a prevailing intention to spend the minimum necessary time in the ERM
II system. In order to simplify some of our considerations, we will assume that this
intention applies generally, i.e. that the euro-candidates intend to enter the ERM II only
for around 2–3 years in order to meet the requirements of the exchange rate criterion.
Given that assumption, the period of membership in the ERM II more or less coincides
2 Note that many central banks prepare regularly an analysis to assess the country’s readiness to adopt euro
such as the “Analyses of the Czech Republic’s current economic alignment with the euro area.”
3 For a recent example of such an analysis, see Pisani-Ferry, Aghion, Ahearne, Belka, von Hagen, Heiken-
sten and Sapir (2008).
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with the period of fulﬁlment of the criterion. In the following text we will call this
period, for simplicity’s sake, the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria.
Needlesstosay, ananalysis—asprovided inthispolicypaper—oftheperspective
from which a euro-candidate’s national central bank looks at the issues of Maastricht
criteria fulﬁlment may prove relevant also for the ECB and the EC themselves. In a
sense, these institutions look at the same issues from the “opposite” angle. Therefore,
their better understanding of the euro-candidates’ viewpoint may make the dialogue
over euro area accession smoother.
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 looks in detail at the interpretation of
the exchange rate and inﬂation criteria, drawing on the experience of countries which
have already adopted the euro and on the Convergence Reports of the ECB and the
Commission. Section 3 builds on the interpretations outlined in the preceding part,
analysing the monetary policy regime/strategy options in the run-up to euro area entry.
Section 4 concludes.
2. The ambiguity of exchange rate criterion and the inﬂation criterion
Article 121 of the Treaty stipulates that both the EC and the European Central Bank
(ECB) are to examine the state of convergence of the Member States. The Conver-
gence Reports are then to be submitted to the Council of the EU, which, based on the
recommendation of the EC, judges whether a given country fulﬁls the necessary con-
ditions for the adoption of the single currency. The fact that it is up to the EC, but not
up to the ECB, to give an ofﬁcial recommendation, explains some of the differences
— to be mentioned below — in how the two institutions treat the two criteria in their
Convergence Reports. Generally speaking, the ECB never gives an explicit verdict on
whether a given country being assessed has met a given criterion.
In order to discuss the strategic monetary policy options in the period of fulﬁlment
of the criteria, we must ﬁrst identify the requirements and restrictions ensuing from
the exchange rate and inﬂation criteria for monetary policy. In other words, we must
identify the probable manner in which the euro-candidate will be evaluated against
these criteria by the Commission and the ECB in their Convergence Reports. This
problem may seem trivial at ﬁrst sight: it is sufﬁcient to read the wording of the criteria
in the Treaty. In fact this is only the ﬁrst step, as the wordings of both criteria in the
Treaty (and in the relevant Protocol to the Treaty) contain some ambiguous passages.
Both these institutions are thus forced to choose and describe in their Convergence
Reports interpretations which eliminate these ambiguities. A detailed reading of these
interpretations, however, reveals that some vagueness remains even here. Our last
chance to get a more precise idea of the application of the criteria is to rely on the prin-
ciple of equal treatment and, in the light thereof, to examine the experience of countries
which have already undergone the evaluation process. Where a given country with a
particular value of a given parameter has (un)successfully undergone the review pro-
cess, the Commission and the ECB have thereby revealed an interpretation of the rele-
vant criterion under which that value is (un)acceptable, and it can be hoped that both
institutions will retain this revealed interpretation in the future. The interpretation of
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the criteria described explicitly in the Convergence Reports will be called the “written
interpretation”, while the interpretation derived from the experience of the countries
which have already been evaluated will be labelled as the “revealed interpretation”.
2.1 The wording and written and revealed interpretation of the exchange rate
criterion
The third indent of Article 121(1) of the Treaty stipulates a requirement to participate
in the exchange rate mechanism for at least two years and that during this period the
exchange rate should ﬂuctuate in the normal ﬂuctuation band and its central parity
should not be devalued (without the need to spend an additional two years in the ERM
II the parity may only be revalued). The exact wording of Article 121(1) of the Treaty
is as follows:
“...the observance of the normal ﬂuctuation margins provided for by the exchange-rate
mechanism of the European Monetary System, for at least two years, without devaluing
against the currency of any other Member State.”
Article 3 of Protocol No. 21 to the Treaty further speciﬁes with respect to the con-
vergence criteria that the exchange rate should ﬂuctuate within the set band without
severe tensions and that the parity may not be devalued on the initiative of the member
state striving to enter the EMU. The exact wording of Article 3 of Protocol No. 21 to
the Treaty is as follows:
“...the criterion on participation in the exchange rate mechanism of the European Mo-
netary System referred to in the third indent of Article 121(1) of this Treaty shall mean
that a Member State has respected the normal ﬂuctuation margins provided for by the
exchange rate mechanism of the European Monetary System without severe tensions
for at least the last two years before the examination. In particular, the Member State
shall not have devalued its currency’s bilateral central rate against any other Member
State’s currency on its own initiative for the same period.”
The wording of the criterion in Article 121 of the Treaty, despite being clariﬁed
in the Protocol, remains ambiguous and has become the subject of much debate (see
for example ´ Egert et al. 2005). A question mark hangs over the actual margins of the
ﬂuctuation band within which movement of the exchange rate is considered acceptable
by the European institutions. Not entirely clear, however, is also the tolerated intensity
of the tensions which accompany the maintenance of the exchange rate within this
band, and the period of time for which the exchange rate must participate in the ERM
II system.
Some clariﬁcation as regards the question of which band is in fact tolerated can be
found in the formulations that have appeared in past Convergence Reports produced
by the Commission and the ECB. Of these two reports, the one prepared by the Com-
mission can be considered more important, for it is the Commission that will prepare,
on the basis of the reports and the member state’s application to enter the EMU, the
recommendation for the EU Council on whether to grant the application or not.
The Commission’s convergence reports reveal that a deviation of the exchange rate
in excess of the normal ERM ﬂuctuation band of ±2.25% is not automatically evalu-
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ated as failure to satisfy the exchange rate criterion. When evaluating an exchange rate
deviation outside the ±2.25% band, the Commission takes the duration of the deviation
into account, but also its amplitude and above all its direction, i.e. whether it is on the
weak or strong side of the band. A deviation towards a stronger exchange rate beyond
the 2.25% limit is not, according to the Commission, inconsistent with fulﬁlment of
the exchange rate criterion (Convergence Report 1998, p. 153). The ECB’s approach
in its convergence reports is similar.
Furthermore, we may attempt to trace the outlines of the revealed interpretation of
this criterion by looking at the exchange rate developments which the present member
countries underwent prior to entering the euro area and which were found to be in
compliance with the Treaty. Speciﬁcally, the exchange rate of the Irish pound in the
review period ﬂuctuated within the margins of -5% to +10% relative to the parity and
the exchange rate of the Greek drachma ﬂuctuated near the limit of +10%.
Regarding the tolerated intensity of the tensions underlying the ﬂuctuations of the
exchange rate close to the central parity, the ECB concentrates on indicators such as the
distance of the exchange rate from the central parity, the short-term interest rate differ-
ential and the size of foreign exchange interventions. It also takes into account whether
there are any reasons for appreciation of the exchange rate (Convergence Report 2004,
p. 11). It is not, however, clear from the ECB’s and the Commission’s statements, or
from the experience of the founder members of the EMU, whether there is a maximum
permissible size of foreign exchange interventions which is still compatible with the
fulﬁlment of the exchange rate criterion and whether signiﬁcant interventions in one
direction only are permissible.
The ECB (2003, p. 6) points out that the assessment of exchange rate stability
against the euro will focus on the exchange rate being close to the central rate while
also taking into account factors that may have led to an appreciation, which is in line
with what was done in the past. Moreover, the issue of absence of “severe tensions”
is, according to the ECB, addressed by examining the degree of deviation of exchange
rates from the ERM II central rates against the euro, by using indicators such as short-
term interest rate differentials vis-` a-vis the euro area and their evolution, and by con-
sidering the role played by foreign exchange interventions.
In any case, one can assume that, provided the exchange rate is maintained — by
whatever means — within the narrow band of ±2.25% during the ERM II, it would
be very difﬁcult for the Commission to talk of non-fulﬁlment of the exchange rate
criterion. This assumption arises in particular in the case of the countries participating
in the ERM II with a currency board (Estonia and Lithuania). Under this exchange rate
regime, the size of the interventions is, by deﬁnition, beyond the decision of the central
bank and may take on signiﬁcant values.
Anotheruncertaintyassociatedwiththeinterpretationoftheexchangeratecriterion
concerns the period of stay in the ERM II. What brings uncertainty into this seemingly
unambiguous aspect of the exchange rate criterion is the experience of Finland and
Italy that had spent more than two years in the then ERM before adopting the euro,
but the Commission and the ECB evaluated the fulﬁlment of the Maastricht criteria
by these countries before they had participated for two years in the ERM II, and the
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same goes for the EU Council’s ﬁnal decision on the fulﬁlment of the convergence
criteria by these countries. In these two cases, therefore, the revealed interpretation
of the criterion was inconsistent with the wording of the criterion, introducing a new
ambiguity into the criterion. It may be, however, that the then more liberal approach of
the European institutions was due in part to an endeavour not to complicate the early
phase of existence of the euro area and that this tolerance will not be repeated in the
case of the euro area expansion.
The revealed interpretation from Convergence Reports can be summarized as fol-
lows: (i) Participation in the ERM II at the time of assessment is mandatory and ex-
pected for at least two years. Some exchange rate stability during a period of non-
participation before entering ERM II can be taken into account, too. (ii) No downward
realignment (devaluation) of the central parity within the two year examination pe-
riod. (iii) Exchange rate to have been maintained within a ﬂuctuation band of ±2.25%
around the currency’s central parity against the euro. An assessment of any deviation
from the ±2.25% ﬂuctuation band would have to take account of the reasons for that
deviation. A distinction is to be made between exchange rate movements above the
±2.25% upper margin and movements below the ±2.25% lower margin.
All this means that the exchange rate criterion should basically be understood as
2.25% on the weaker side and wider band on the stronger side. In addition, going
beyond the 2.25% limit on the weaker side does not automatically mean a violation of
the criterion, and at the same time, the possibility of revaluation of the central parity
questions the existence of any limit on the stronger side. It is thus possible to conclude
that to meet the criterion, it is necessary to avoid devaluation of the central parity and to
ensure that the exchange rate is not too frequently well beyond the 2.25% limit on the
weaker side despite interventions via interest rate hikes and exchange reserves sales.
On the basis of all the information mentioned above, we can identify the following
“pragmatic” interpretation of the exchange rate criterion, which on the one hand will
provide clear scope for exchange rate ﬂuctuations, and on the other hand should ensure,
with an acceptable degree of probability, approval of the fulﬁlment of the criterion by
the Council:
“Participation in the ERM II exchange rate mechanism for a period of two years within
a ﬂuctuation band of -2.25% to +10%. A short-term deviation outside this band (even
in the depreciation direction, see the experience of Ireland) may be tolerated; in the
case of a marked strengthening, the parity may be revalued bilaterally. Signiﬁcant
interventions are acceptable at least where they lead to the exchange rate being main-
tained within a band of ±2.25%.”
Let us add that maintaining the exchange rate in any band narrower than the stan-
dard ±15% ERM II band is exclusively up to the given country: under the rules of the
ERM II system any interventional assistance by the ECB can be expected mainly when
the limit of ±15% is in jeopardy.
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2.2 The wording and written and revealed interpretation of the inﬂation criterion
The ﬁrst indent of Article 121(1) of the Treaty stipulates price stability as a further
condition for adoption of the single currency. This condition is fulﬁlled if inﬂation in
the candidate country does not exceed that in the three best performing countries by
more than 1.5 percentage points. The exact wording of the Treaty is as follows:
“...the achievement of a high degree of price stability; this will be apparent from a rate
of inﬂation which is close to that of, at most, the three best performing Member States
in terms of price stability.”
The subsequent Protocol to the Treaty, ﬁrst paragraph, speciﬁes the calculation
method. Inﬂation is measured by means of the HICP and as a twelve-month moving
average:
“...the criterion on price stability referred to in the ﬁrst indent of Article 121(1) of this
Treaty shall mean that a Member State has a price performance that is sustainable and
an average rate of inﬂation, observed over a period of one year before the examination,
that does not exceed by more than 1.5 percentage points that of, at most, the three
best performing Member States in terms of price stability. Inﬂation shall be measured
by means of the consumer price index on a comparable basis, taking into account
differences in national deﬁnitions.”
Just as in the case of the exchange rate criterion, the wording of the inﬂation cri-
terion, despite being clariﬁed in the Protocol, is ambiguous.4 The vagueness relates
above all to the term “best performance”, which constitutes the key for selecting the
three countries whose inﬂation rates are to enter the calculation of the reference value.
Also vague, however, is the meaning of the term “sustainable”.
No matter how vague the words “best performance” may be, in the older Conver-
gence Reports the Commission and ECB agreed on a plain and unambiguous written
interpretation, i.e. that “best performance” means the lowest inﬂation. In the Conver-
gence Reports for 2004 a country with negative inﬂation (Lithuania) appeared for the
ﬁrst time, and both institutions thus faced the question of whether to apply their inter-
pretation to countries with negative inﬂation. The Commission took a rather strict and
still unambiguous stand on this issue: “best performance”, according to the Commis-
sion, is the lowest non-negative inﬂation.
By comparison, the ECB adopted a rather more benevolent position:
“The price developments in Lithuania over the reference period, which resulted in a
12-month average rate of -0.2% due to the accumulation of speciﬁc factors, have been
judged to be an outlier. This ﬁgure has consequently been excluded from the calcula-
tion of the reference value as it might otherwise have given rise to a distortion in the
reference value and reduced the usefulness of the reference value as an economically
meaningful benchmark.”
4 Proposals have been made for a change of wording of the criterion directly in the Treaty (Buiter 2004;
Buiter and Grafe 2002, inter alia). For example, it has been proposed to select the three reference countries
only from among the euro area countries; to base the reference value of the criterion not on the average
of the three countries with the best inﬂation results, but instead on the average for the entire euro area; to
concentrate only on inﬂation of traded goods; and so on. In this paper, however, we concentrate exclusively
on the issue of the interpretation within the limits of the present wording of the Treaty.
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It is, therefore, the ECB’s written interpretation in particular that leaves some de-
gree of ambiguity as regards the inﬂation criterion. This interpretation has so far ex-
plicitly been used only once. Thus, it is impossible to get a clear idea at least about the
revealed interpretation. At least, we can perhaps infer that the ECB intends to use the
outlier concept only very cautiously. What leads us to this hypothesis is the fact that
in 2004 one of the countries included in the calculation of the reference value of the
criterion in the ECB’s Convergence Report was Finland, with an inﬂation rate of mere
0.4%. Moreover, the extraordinarily low inﬂation in Finland during 2004 was largely
due to a clearly exceptional, administrative measure: sharp decrease in excise duty on
alcohol (Bank of Finland 2005). The reluctance of the ECB to use the concept of out-
lier transpires also from Spring 2006 Convergence Report where the reference value is
calculated from three “best performers” of which at least two — Finland and Sweden
— again are countries with exceptionally low inﬂation rates (not exceeding 1%).
Although it cannot be entirely ruled out that in the future countries with low posi-
tive inﬂation might also be exempted from the calculation of inﬂation in the reference
countries, on the basis of the above-mentioned considerations it is possible to desig-
nate as a pragmatic interpretation of the inﬂation criterion the one which appeared in
the Commission’s Convergence Report for 2004, i.e. the interpretation in which the
reference countries are the three EU members with the lowest non-negative inﬂation.
This interpretation, however, in no way clariﬁes the use of the term “sustainable”.
Sustainability was raised — at least indirectly — as an issue in the 2006 Convergence
Reports for Lithuania and Slovenia where the assessment included a look at whether
inﬂation had been above or below the reference values in the previous months and
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whether it was likely to be above or below the reference values in the months ahead.
For each of the two member states, however, these sustainability considerations were
pointing in the same direction as the single-month comparison of the reference value
versus actual value. Therefore, it is not obvious how much such considerations would
inﬂuence the overall assessment in other cases. So far, thus, there is a lack of clear
signals for a “pragmatic” interpretation of the term “sustainable”.
The past development of the reference value of the inﬂation criterion according
to the above-mentioned interpretation is shown in Figure 1. The variability of this
value over time is quite evident in the chart. At the same time one can see that in the
enlarged EU this value often ﬂuctuates at a lower level than in the original, 15-member
Union. Both these factors increase the risk that not even relatively low inﬂation can
guarantee with certainty the fulﬁlment of the inﬂation criterion in accordance with the
above-mentioned pragmatic interpretation.
As regards euro-candidates whose monetary policy operates under a regime of in-
ﬂation targeting with inﬂation targets set in terms of their national consumer price in-
dexes (CPI),thesecountriesshould, ofcourse, alsotakeintoconsideration any method-
ological, and therefore also quantitative, differences between this CPI and the harmo-
nized index of consumer prices (HICP), with which the criterion operates. As indicated
by Figure 2, this difference may be at least temporarily relatively large.
Figure 2. Difference between the CPI and HICP in selected countries targeting CPI inﬂation













Note: Positive values — in percentage points — indicate higher CPI inﬂation than HICP inﬂation.
Source: Eurostat
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3. Monetary policy regime options in ERM II
This section discusses the main issues related to monetary policy strategy for euro-
candidates. It ﬁrst investigates the attributes of optimum monetary policy regime and
thendiscussesthecomplexityofthechoiceofexchange rateregimeandERMIIcentral
parity.
3.1 Five important aspects of the optimum regime
The choice of optimum monetary policy regime is complicated by the fact that the
concept of “optimum regime” may have a different content depending on what weight
we attach to its individual aspects. When trying to structure the decision-making on
the optimum monetary policy regime during the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria, we
need to take the following ﬁve basic aspects into consideration:
(i) The probability of fulﬁlment of the Maastricht criteria. Almost all the countries
that aspire, or will aspire in the future, to enter the euro area are experiencing
marked long-term appreciation of their equilibrium real exchange rates (´ Egert et al.
2006). This real appreciation can take place either through an inﬂation differential
or through the nominal exchange rate appreciation, or through a combination of the
two. Apparently, there is a trade-off between the fulﬁlment of the two criteria. The
manoeuvring space for safe parallel fulﬁlment of both criteria is of course larger,
the smaller is the equilibrium appreciation. Assuming that the period of fulﬁlment
of the convergence criteria is too long for the national central bank to be able,
or willing, to artiﬁcially maintain the economy out of equilibrium throughout this
period using monetary policy instruments, monetary policy makers face indeed a
difﬁcult task: to distribute the overall equilibrium real appreciation between the
above-mentioned two channels in such a way that both the exchange rate and the
inﬂation criteria are fulﬁlled, or in such a way that these criteria are fulﬁlled with
the same probability.
(ii) Internalconsistency. SomeaspectsrelatingtoERMIImembership, ortofulﬁlment
of the Maastricht criteria, are not necessarily mutually consistent if the country re-
tains its existing monetary policy regime. From the point of view of successful
fulﬁlment of the exchange rate criterion it is very difﬁcult to retain, for example,
a free ﬂoat. From the point of view of fulﬁlling the inﬂation criterion it may be,
on the contrary, dangerous to completely ﬁx the exchange rate in a context of real
equilibrium appreciation. Another example of inconsistent monetary policy is tar-
geting a rate of inﬂation that is clearly higher than the probable inﬂation criterion.
(iii) Economic appropriateness. Even if monetary policy strategy is internally con-
sistent during the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria, it might not necessarily be
appropriate for the economy at that particular moment in time. For example, trying
to keep inﬂation too low may result in an excessively restrictive monetary policy
and a loss in the form of reduced economic growth (Bul´ ıˇ r and Hurn´ ık 2006). The
opposite situation, i.e. an overheating of the economy, may occur if the exchange
rate is ﬁxed at too depreciated a level.
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(iv) Transparency. If the central bank is transparent to the public, it is usually also
more credible and attains its aims more easily (Blinder 1998). Transparency and
the ensuing effectiveness is doubly important for a central bank which is obliged
to attain several objectives at the same time and can only be successful if it fulﬁls
every one of them. On the other hand, the pursuit of transparency has its limits, as
it may lead to reduction in ﬂexibility (Mishkin 2004). In spite of this, during this
period the central bank should be as open as possible as regards its objectives and
should not attempt to conceal any facts from the public.
(v) Continuity with the previous regime. A change of monetary policy regime entails
considerable costs, especially if the previous regime has been in place for a long
time and economic agents have adapted their behaviour to it. For this reason, cen-
tral banks usually resort to a change of regime only in situations where there is no
other way out (see, for example, Masson and Ruge-Murcia 2005).
While some euro-candidates operate under a ﬁxed exchange rate (e.g. Bulgaria and
Montenegro), the majority are inﬂation targeters (e.g. the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania, Sweden and Turkey), mostly with managed or free ﬂoating. It is
within the latter group that ERM II entry and the need to fulﬁl the Maastricht criteria
confronts the central bank with the dilemma of whether or not to modify its regime. If
a country has a favourable experience with inﬂation targeting and if it has succeeded in
makingitsinﬂationtargetcredible, thecostsofchanging theregimeareunderstandably
higher. A credible inﬂation target may better anchor low inﬂation expectations and
thus foster fulﬁlment of the inﬂation criterion. Regarding the former group, countries
with a ﬁxed exchange rate would ﬁnd it difﬁcult to explain the abandonment of their
previous nominal anchor in the form of a ﬁxed exchange rate, no matter how this might
facilitate their fulﬁlment of the inﬂation criterion. This is also what the experience
of the countries which have already entered the mechanism would suggest (Estonia,
Lithuania and Latvia retained their currency boards, while Malta switched from an
exchange rate ﬁxed to a currency basket to a rate ﬁxed to the euro).
For most of the euro-candidates there is no regime that would satisfy all the above-
mentioned desirable aspects to the full. If, for example, we gave priority to the aspect
of fulﬁlment of the criteria, this could be only done to the detriment of continuity
with previous regime, internal consistency and/or economic sustainability. For the
majority of the euro-candidates, therefore, the choice of monetary policy regime for the
period of fulﬁlment of the criteria represents a challenge to ﬁnd a suitable compromise
between the aspects mentioned.
3.2 Exchange rate regime and loss of autonomy
There has been a very lively debate on the role and sense of ERM II between the ECB,
the EC and the acceding countries. The Eurosystem position regarding ERM II is set
out in the “Policy position of the Governing Council of the ECB on exchange rate
issues relating to the acceding countries” (ECB 2003). This document builds on the
Position Paper “The Eurosystem and the Accession Process” endorsed by the Govern-
ing Council on 21 November 2002. The Position Paper puts forward the view that:
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“ERM II offers a meaningful framework for combining nominal and real convergence
and should therefore not be seen as a mere “ante-chamber” before the adoption of
the euro ... ERM II should be seen as a useful regime on its own right, as a number of
policy challenges can be tackled within that framework in the run-up to the adoption of
the euro ... ERM II is likely to be beneﬁcial for the accession countries in their pursuit
of real and nominal convergence.”
One of the most striking features of this particular argumentation is the appar-
ent lack of attention devoted to the target zones literature that developed especially in
the 1990s (Krugman 1991; Bertola and Caballero 1992; or Svensson 1994). Finan-
cial crises and the subsequent literature on multiple equilibria, self-fulﬁlling specula-
tive attacks and reversals of capital ﬂows (e.g. Eichengreen and Wyplosz 1993) made
economists more aware of the complicated dynamics of modern ﬁnancial markets.
This paved the way for an understanding of the beneﬁts of corner solutions (e.g. Fis-
cher 2001), i.e., of adopting either a very ﬁxed exchange rate commitment (preferably
without any inﬂation or other targets) or, on the contrary, a very loose exchange rate
commitment (and, possibly, other targets). Indeed, the practice of the last two decades
typically favours one of these “corner solutions”.
While a ﬁrmly ﬁxed exchange rate (one corner solution) is in conformity with the
“pragmatic” interpretation of the exchange rate criterion as mentioned in Section 2, a
ﬂexible exchange rate regime (the other corner solution) may be at variance with it.
From the point of view of fulﬁlment of the exchange rate criterion, the nearest solution
to the above-mentioned “corner” is the widest possible ﬂuctuation band compatible
with the pragmatic deﬁnition of fulﬁlment of the exchange rate criterion. Fulﬁlment of
the exchange rate criterion in the “pragmatic” interpretation, as mentioned in Section 2,
may be achieved by exchange rate regimes ranging from a completely ﬁxed rate to
a rate ﬂuctuating within the maximum ﬂuctuation band of -2.25% to approximately
+10% (wide ﬂuctuation band henceforth). In this regard, we discuss only these two
genericsolutions, i.e.acompletelyﬁxedexchangerateandanexchangerateﬂuctuating
within the maximum ﬂuctuation band compatible with fulﬁlment of the exchange rate
criterion.
For both these options there is an implicit possibility of a change of central parity;
given the wording of the exchange rate criterion, however, only a revaluation comes
into consideration. In the following text this possibility will be explicitly mentioned
only in those cases where it will have to be allowed for in advance. In all the op-
tions it is also possible to consider sub-options differing in whether the ﬂuctuation
band would be ofﬁcially declared or whether it would be targeted only implicitly (see
Crespo-Cuaresma et al. 2005 for empirical investigation on some euro-candidates).
Refraining from any active endeavour to fulﬁl the exchange rate criterion, i.e. the alter-
native of not targeting any exchange rate band except for that given directly by ERM
II membership, can also, of course, be considered one of the generic alternatives; in
such case, however, the risk of the actual development of the exchange rate leading to
non-fulﬁlment of the criterion increases.
An unpleasant fact which the central bank of a euro-candidate must take into con-
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sideration is the loss of monetary policy autonomy.5 Although formally the loss of
domestic monetary policy autonomy does not occur until accession to the euro area,
in reality the central bank loses part of its autonomy much earlier. The reason for this
is that as the credible date of the country’s assumed entry into the euro area approa-
ches, its long-term interest rates become increasingly determined by expectations of
the future development of short-term euro rates, and not domestic rates. Where a ﬁxed
exchange rate is chosen for the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria, the central bank
must maintain interest rates at the same level as euro rates (in the case of fully credible
entry into the euro area the risk premium will equal zero), and will thus, for example,
lose its inﬂuence on one-year rates a year before the expected ﬁxing of the exchange
rate. In the case of the wide ﬂuctuation band the loss of autonomy might be less appar-
ent (the risk premium is non-zero even in the case of credible entry into the euro area).
The movement of interest rates, however, is signiﬁcantly curbed by the evolution of
the exchange rate. Given that exchange rate appreciation expectations are typical of
a large proportion of the euro-candidates, domestic interest rates should be roughly at
the same level as those of the ECB (with a low, positive, risk premium), or lower than
those of the ECB (with a zero risk premium).
What was the experience of the current euro area members during their stay in
ERM II? Figure 3 plots the one-year interest rate differential against DEM (the anchor
of the system prior to the euro birth) or EUR for eleven countries6 for the period of
24 months before adopting the euro. Not surprisingly, some countries had rather large
positive interest rate differential against DEM. In addition, the differential persisted
even half a year before the ﬁnal conversion. Also Slovenia, as a representative of
NMSs experienced nearly a two percent differential even a year before adoption of the
euro. Such a differential nevertheless does not indicate the existence of large scope for
an autonomous interest rate policy. It concerned primarily the countries with relatively
high inﬂation during the 1990s and low policy credibility that was reﬂected in the lack
of the date-of-switch-to-euro credibility.
3.3 Fixing of the exchange rate versus utilization of the maximum bandwidth
In the following passage we address the question of choosing the optimum exchange
rate bandwidth and central parity so as to minimize the risks ensuing from the require-
ment to fulﬁl the Maastricht criteria and make maximum use of the merits of each of
the options discussed.
As aforementioned, the exchange rate criterion permits revaluation of the central
parity. If the exchange rate, owing to adverse circumstances or a speculative attack,
shows a strong tendency towards appreciation, it is, in principle, possible in both
regimes discussed — the ﬁxed exchange rate and the wide ﬂuctuation band — to take
5 By autonomy we mean the ability to inﬂuence interest rates with maturities of one year or longer. Crespo-
Cuaresma and Wojcik (2006) measure monetary policy autonomy in selected EU new member states and
ﬁnd that although greater exchange rate ﬂexibility is associated with greater monetary policy autonomy, none
of the countries analysed has a fully autonomous monetary policy, even with a ﬂoating exchange rate.
6 Luxembourg and Austria as the countries without own monetary policies and Malta due to the lack of data
on money market rates are not included.
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advantage of this asymmetry and revalue the parity. However, the possibility that the
pressure concerned is only transitory can never be ruled out; this might lead to a later
requirement to devalue the parity back to its original level and thus to breach one of the
requirements of the exchange rate criterion. It will therefore be important to make use
of the possibilityof revaluation only aftercareful consideration and, where appropriate,
after making use of the possibilities for defending the original parity.
In many countries the ﬁxed exchange rate regime has not proved successful ending
often in speculative attacks (Fisher 2001). Nevertheless, this experience is not neces-
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sarily relevant to the euro-candidates. A ﬁxed exchange rate based on a hard-set point
in the form of a permanent ﬁxing of the exchange rate on euro area entry (so-called
“exit”) at a predetermined moment in time may be much more robust to speculative
pressures.7 A ﬁxed exchange rate within the ERM II is the approach that so far pre-
dominates among the new EU member states which, however, is probably due to the
fact that these countries operated in the ﬁxed exchange rate regime already before their
ERM II entry.
It is true that in the case of a ﬁxed exchange rate — provided that the selected as-
sumptions of equilibrium exchange rate and price development apply — the stability of
the nominal exchange rate implies some inﬂationary pressure and hence also the threat
of failure to satisfy the inﬂation criterion. This danger, however, can be consciously
reduced. The parity can be ﬁxed, for example, at a slightly stronger level relative to the
actual exchange rate which will roughly correspond to the equilibrium exchange rate at
the horizon of the permanent ﬁxing against the euro. A ﬁxed exchange rate may even
have the important advantage in terms of meeting the inﬂation criterion in a small open
economy, as is characteristic of the majority of the euro-candidates. Since any ﬂuctua-
tion in the exchange rate passes through signiﬁcantly to the price level (Coricelli et al.
2006), a ﬁxed exchange rate, may eliminate the risk of inﬂation ﬂuctuations resulting
from excessive exchange rate movements.
The second generic exchange rate regime option for the period of fulﬁlment of
the criteria is maximum utilization of the ﬂuctuation band, i.e. within the margins of
approximately-2.25%to+10%. Themaintheoreticaladvantageofthewideﬂuctuation
band should be the ability to absorb shocks through the exchange rate. However, this
has received little empirical support for euro-candidates. For example, Borghijs and
Kuijs (2004) have studied the ability of Central European currencies to respond to
shocks and have found that currencies in the Central Europe have tended to generate
shocks rather than to absorb them. Another advantage of the wide ﬂuctuation band
is that it preserves some, though rather limited, degree of domestic monetary policy
autonomy during the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria. For the countries operating
under IT before entering ERM II, the wide ﬂuctuation band may be advantageous due
to the lack of experience with ﬁrm ﬁxing of exchange rate and thus potentially lower
credibility in doing so. As regards the approximately two-year period of fulﬁlment
of the criteria, it is, generally, not possible to say with certainty whether maximum
utilization of exchange rate ﬂexibility will foster a stabilization of the economy or, on
the contrary, will damage it.
3.4 Setting the parity
In this section we study certain scenarios dependent on the exchange rate regime of
a given euro-candidate and parity setting with respect to actual exchange rate. We
focus on the differences between ﬁxed versus ﬂexible exchange rate arrangements in
the context of a long-run appreciation.
7 Nevertheless, it is vital to note that a breach of the ﬁxed exchange rate commitment would not necessarily
mean failure to satisfy the exchange rate criterion.
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An issue that enters into the debate on the setting of the initial ERM II parity is that
ofthelong-termequilibriumexchangerate. Itisreasonabletoassume, especiallyunder
the ﬁxed exchange rate regime, that the irrevocable conversion rate of the domestic
currency to the euro will be identical to the ERM II parity. Then, parity should be
derived from the estimated equilibrium real exchange rate as of the expected euro area
entry date and, if any, assumed inﬂation differential. For most of the euro-candidates
thiswouldimplysettingtheparityatastrongerlevel relativetotheactual exchange rate
when entering ERM II.8 It is not, however, entirely clear whether the beneﬁts of such
a step (lower inﬂation over a longer period, i.e. an endeavour to maximize aspect (i)
from Section 3.1) will prevail over the potential costs (an excessively strong exchange
rate over short period and increased market volatility, i.e. a deterioration of aspect (iii)
from Section 3.1).



































The question is whether the parity value should be signalled by the central bank in
advance, and, if so, how far in advance. Early publication would on the one hand quash
speculation and steer the exchange rate in the right direction from the central bank’s
point of view. On the other hand, however, such a signal represents a commitment
which in time may prove to be hasty. It is also necessary to take into consideration
that the parity is set by joint decision of the EU member states and the authorities of
8 The experience of the countries that are fulﬁlling, or have already fulﬁlled the criteria, speaks in favour of
ﬁxing the parity at the current market value. The only exceptions have been Slovenia, which ﬁxed at a rate
stronger than the current market value due to its earlier than initially planned entry into the ERM II (before
expected appreciation of the domestic currency had enough time to run its full course), and Cyprus, which
set its parity at the level of an earlier parity (the more appreciated current level of the exchange rate was
considered to be only a temporary blip). The relevance of these countries for many of the future members of
the ERM II is reduced, however, by the fact that neither of them had a ﬂoating exchange rate, hence they de
facto continued to ﬁx their exchange rate at the current level of the ﬁx.
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the EU and so any signalling of the parity may be seen as anticipating the result of
this joint decision. This interpretation can be avoided by the central bank declaring
in advance that the parity will be set roughly at the level derived from the estimation
of the equilibrium value of real exchange rate as of the expected euro area entry date.
A similar scenario is proposed by Buiter (2004). Figure 4 illustrates this hypothetical
exchange rate scenario with early signalling of the parity.
On the other hand, this strategy requires a fairly accurate idea of the value of the
equilibrium real exchange rate at a horizon of around three years. Estimates of the
equilibrium value of the exchange rate are associated with considerable uncertainty
(see ´ Egert et al. 2006) and central banks tend to have only a general idea of the range
within which the exchange range is more or less in equilibrium. An excessively fast
appreciation might, moreover, have a negative impact on economic activity. The stra-
tegy of an “overvalued” parity also increases the risk of speculation on a devaluation
of the exchange rate and hence the risk of a breaking ERM II margin on the weaker
side (depending on the effectiveness of foreign exchange interventions), leading to the
commencement of a new compulsory two-year stay in the ERM II.
If the wide ﬂuctuation band is opted for, the solution might be to set the ERM II
parity near to the equilibrium exchange rate as of the ERM II entry date, from which
the current market exchange rate should not differ too much. Assuming that the annual
pace of real equilibrium appreciation is lower than 5% and that the exchange rate does
not deviate markedly from its equilibrium path, the exchange rate would stay within the
wide ﬂuctuation band during the roughly two-year period of fulﬁlment of the criteria
and there would likely be no need for any major interventions or early revaluation of
the parity.
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In such a situation it may be desirable to revalue the parity shortly — such as se-
veral months — before euro area entry (based on an assessment of the current market
rate and on the authorities’ idea of the development of the equilibrium), as in the case
of Ireland and Greece. This would allay concerns that the currency will be ﬁxed at
the initial parity level (as these concerns would probably lead to depreciation of the ex-
change rate back towards this parity). The above-described exchange rate development
under the wide ﬂuctuation band regime is shown schematically in Figure 5.
4. Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to investigate the monetary policy options of a euro area
accession country during the period of fulﬁllment of the Maastricht exchange rate and
inﬂation criteria. We ﬁrst analyzed the “rules of the game” (i.e. how the two criteria
are implemented by the Commission and the ECB) and then we identiﬁed possible
monetary policy strategies within these rules.
We pointed out that some degree of ambiguity was contained not only in the word-
ing of both criteria in the Treaty and the Protocols, but also in their interpretation of
both criteria as recorded in the past Convergence Reports of the Commission and the
ECB. Hence there is a need to search for the likely interpretation with the help of the
experience of the countries that have already, successfully or unsuccessfully, under-
gone the evaluation. Even at the end of this search, however, some ambiguities still
persist with respect to both criteria; hence the efforts of the euro-candidates to satisfy
these criteria are, to some extent, like shooting at a target which is only vaguely de-
ﬁned.
We then gave some thought to the question of whether and how a candidate can
steer a course through the likely interpretations of the two criteria (with all their am-
biguities). The considerations of the national central bank of a euro-candidate country
in the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria are not concentrated solely on fulﬁlment of
the criteria. The central bank must also keep in mind other aspects such as the inter-
nal consistency and economic appropriateness of its monetary policy, and continuity
with the previous monetary policy regime. A deeper analysis of these aspects reveals
that for most of the euro-candidates there is no regime which would satisfy all the
above-mentioned desirable aspects completely. Hence the choice of monetary policy
regime for the period of fulﬁlment of the criteria represents for the majority of the
euro-candidates a challenge and they need to ﬁnd a suitable compromise between the
aspects mentioned.
In line with the prevailing opinion in theoretical as well as practical central-banking
community that “corner” solutions in the exchange rate regimes are preferable, we fo-
cused our attention on two boundary exchange rate regime options for a euro-candidate
country: a completely ﬁxed exchange rate and an exchange rate ﬂuctuating within
the widest ﬂuctuation band compatible with fulﬁlment of the exchange rate criterion.
The choice between these two regimes depends on many factors which are typically
country-speciﬁc, such as the expected pace of equilibrium real appreciation, the pre-
vious monetary policy regime and its credibility or the ability and willingness of the
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government to adjust its ﬁscal policy as needed. Therefore, we investigated the advan-
tages and disadvantages of both exchange rate regime options and make proposals for
the speciﬁc implementation of the chosen regime until the setting of the central parity.
The wide ﬂuctuation band may look advantageous for the countries operating under IT
before entering ERM II. However, it is not possible to say with certainty whether maxi-
mum utilization of exchange rate ﬂexibility will foster stabilization of the economy or,
on the contrary, will damage it. It is, of course, up to the policy-makers in the relevant
countries to set all these considerations into the speciﬁc context of their economy and
to identify the approach that will maximize the chances of successful adoption of the
euro.
Finally, we focused on the possible conﬂict between the attempt to conduct au-
tonomous monetary policy and meeting the convergence criteria when the wide ﬂuc-
tuation band was opted for. This scope for policy autonomy is nevertheless rather
limited since it would be difﬁcult to achieve signiﬁcant changes in the relevant interest
rates without associated changes in exchange rate expectations and risk premia. The
decision on the distance of parity from the actual exchange rate will have important
implication for the subsequent interest rate and exchange rate dynamics. First, setting
the central parity stronger than the actual exchange rate may be a useful tool for curb-
ing inﬂation. It may, however, also be a risky strategy since the exchange rate may
not move gradually but in jumps. And jumps may be accompanied by over-shooting.
Second, a practical option is to set the central parity at the prevailing exchange rate
level. This may have some potential to create initial appreciation expectations and thus
somewhat reduce inﬂationary expectations. Third, under some circumstances, the cen-
tral parity may be set even at a level weaker than the actual exchange rate. Both the
second and the third option may ﬁnally be “assisted” by revaluation of the parity (the
so-called“Greek”way). Thesustainabilityofallthreeoptionsdependstoagreatextent
on the credibility of not only the central parity but rather the overall macroeconomic
environment.
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